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conomic historians have long noted a high correla-
tion between financial crises and downturns in
economic activity. One of the more widely discussed
cases during the past two decades is the Nordic banking
crisis. During the early 1990s, Norway, Finland, and Sweden
all experienced severe banking difficulties. Although events
in each country differ, there was a common “two stage”
sequence in each country: rapidly increasing economic
growth accompanied by financial liberalization and the
introduction of new financial instruments, followed by
sharp recession and financial crisis.1 In Norway, loan losses
were 0.7 percent of total loans in 1987 and increased to 6
percent in 1991; in Finland, loan losses were 0.5 percent
in 1989 and increased to 4.7 percent in 1992; in Sweden,
losses were 0.3 percent in 1989 and increased to 7 percent
in 1992.2 Widespread losses affected the residential and
commercial real estate, retail, and service sectors, among
others. Some losses were exacerbated by foreign currency
exposure.
Honkapohja (2009) cites deregulation of the financial
system in the 1980s as the root of both the economic down-
turn and the financial crisis.3 Around 1980, attractive
interest rates amplified inflows of capital; in these deregu-
lated markets, credit expanded according to market forces.
Honkapohja notes that this “led to uncontrolled credit
expansion” and “soaring indebtedness in the private sector”
and furthermore that the rules and practices of 1969 were
left unchanged when banking was deregulated and financial
instruments evolved. The result was an increase in informa-
tion asymmetry—the now all-too-familiar historical pre-
cursor to financial crises—amplified by international capital
inflows. If international investors enter a country with com-
plete information, and if their confidence in the country
does not change, then that country’s economy may be able
to function well with a relatively high level of international
debt. However, if investors enter a country with imperfect
information, or if the rate of growth changes, they may seek
to withdraw capital. Honkapohja cites Denmark in counter-
point: The essential feature of Denmark was a much smaller
level of asymmetric information: “Prudential supervision,
disclosure rules, and capital adequacy requirements for
Danish banks were made stricter than the other Nordic
banks.” 
Honkapohja offers some recommendations, based on the
Nordic experience, for policy responses to financial crises4:
First, build a bipartisan political consensus to support the
actions needed to maintain confidence in the banking
system. This includes establishing a new crisis resolution
agency to handle both communication with the public and
bank restructuring. If successful, such an agency can reduce
conflicts of interest or “turf fights” among existing agencies
while providing capital and liquidity to banks, even if
another agency (such as the central bank) provides funding.
This agency may also be well placed to moderate inevitable
attempts by bank owners to capture for themselves a greater
share of the largesse—actions that can undermine public
support for crisis resolution. Second, seek private solutions,
including mergers and acquisitions; avoid liquidations when
possible. Third, be very transparent regarding support
actions. In the Nordic case, public confidence was sustained
and bank runs avoided (absent government deposit insur-
ance) through a highly visible public government guarantee
for the obligations of banks, including both deposits and
borrowings.5 While debt holders were protected, equity
holders suffered decreases in value but were not automati-
cally wiped out when the governments provided support. 
An additional element of the Nordic resolution was
openness, “refraining from concealing both the extent and
nature of the problem.”6 This required openly accounting
for all expected losses and write-downs, for all banks, at
an early stage. For many assets, especially real estate, this
is a difficult problem; Ingves and Lind (1996) note that in
Sweden this was successfully solved with adjusted asset
values subsequently earning a return “close to the market
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“The Nordic bank resolution 
is widely regarded as among 
the most successful in history.”rate.” They also emphasize the “unpleasant truth” about
banking crisis resolutions that there will be losses and that
the “loss has to be covered—in one way or another.” Besides
guiding public assistance, honest accounting may instill
confidence in private investors who perhaps will recapitalize
potentially viable banks. Of the six large banks in Sweden,
for example, three received public assistance and three did
not; the latter were able to raise necessary capital privately.7
Society-wide benefits also might accrue if the fire-sale dis-
posal of assets can be avoided and public confidence in
the financial system can be sustained.8
The Nordic bank resolution is widely regarded as among
the most successful in history. In all three countries, the
final net cost of assistance to the banks (net of liquidation
of assets and including appreciation in the value of govern-
ment shares) was far smaller than the initial cost—for
Sweden and Norway, near zero, for Finland, an eventual
5.3 percent of 1997 GDP versus initial outlays of 9 percent
of GDP.9 ￿
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1 This pattern is the classic historical experience, perhaps observed first in Britain
in 1825 (Neal, 1998). For the U.S. experience since 1857, see Mishkin (1991).
2 These figures are from Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998).
3 While noting the correlation between deregulation and the crisis, Drees and
Pazarbaşioğlu (1998) place more weight on deteriorating macroeconomic condi-
tions, declines in income (particularly oil, in the case of Norway, but also in the
terms of trade for commodity exporters such as Sweden), and depressed asset
markets.
4 The Nordic countries did not invent these solutions; their actions were modeled,
in a large part, on the U.S. Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Generally,
Honkapohja’s points are discussed in all the references listed below.
5 This type of ex post government deposit insurance has become almost an
expected feature of banking crises. The British government expanded its limited
deposit insurance to deposits in full after the runs on Northern Rock (see Mizen,
2008); in the United States, the FDIC recently increased its deposit insurance
limit, temporarily, to $250,000 on most accounts and added unlimited insurance
for non-interest-bearing transaction deposits (used primarily by businesses).
6 Ingves and Lind (1996, pp. 9-10).
7 Berg (1998, Table 11.1, p. 197) provides figures, by bank, as the end of 1993.
Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu (1998, chap. 6) provide similar 1993 figures for Sweden
but a more detailed chronology for Norway and Finland.
8 See Ingves and Lind’s (1996) superior discussion of the social and political
trade-offs inherent in any bank support actions.
9 See Table 2 in Honkapohja (2008), which he cites from Sandal (2004).
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